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NEW MEXICO DURING THE CIVIL WAR
By WILLIAM I. WALDRIP

(Continued)
III Union Successes
OON after General Sibley had decided upon a course of
action, the Confederates acted quickly, and began their
trek to the North. When the Texans reached Socorro on February 22, the militia stationed there surrendered almost immediately.1 The townspeople were accused of disloyalty, and
complaints were also raised against the native troops who
deserted as the enemy approached. 2 Continuing on to Albuquerque, the Texans, entered the town on the second of
March.
The Federals, knowing of the Confederate approach,
had given away and burned much of their military supplies
just prior to the entrance of the enemy. Fear of destr:oying
private homes by fire, however, kept the destruction from
being compiete. 3 , The townspeople in " ... their insatiable
desire for plunder ..." frightened the Quartermaster into
leaving much property undamaged. 4 The Confederates descended upon these stores voraciously. Over si,x million dollars worth was seized, and then foolishly destroyed. One of
the troops, who saw no' purpose in such destruction, opined
it occurred" " . because our men were getting drunk on
the whiskey and our commander had never been sober, ... "5
On the thirteenth of March the Texans issued a proclamation which granted amnesty to all who would quit the Fed, eral service in ten days. 6 This was designed to weaken further the allegiance of the natives.
Governor Connelly complained of the conduct of the invaders when he wrote:

S

L. R., Micro. No. 171. Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
O. R., I, 9 :605. MajOT Charles E. Wesche Report, April 25, 1862.
3. L .. R.. loco cit.
.
4. O. R., I. 9 :528. Enos to 'Donaldson, March 11, 1862.
5. Noel, op. cit.• p. 61. (Noel himself was a teetotaler, p. 40.)
6. ,L. R .• Micro. No. 171. Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
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2.
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I am sorry to say that the Texans have not behaved
with the moderation that was expected, and that desolation
has marked their progress on the Rio Grande from Craig to
Bernalillo. Exactions and confiscations are of daily occurrence, and the larger portion of those who have anything to
give or to lose are here [Las Vegas] on this frontier, seeking
a refuge from their rapacity, and have left their houses and
contents a prey to the invaders. 7

This ruthlessness which may have been forced by necessitywas later to prove a serious handicap when the tables
were turned.
Continuing on to Santa Fe, the Confederates resumed
their burning and destruction, and soon again were short of
supplies. s At the same time ex-Surveyor General William
Pelham was appointed Territorial Governor at Santa Fe by
the Confederates, and everyone was required to swear allegiance on penalty of loss of property.9
With the Texans making such rapid progress, Canby
again pleaded for more troops.10 This time Secretary of War
Stanton ordered Major-General Henry W.Halleck, at that
time the ranking officer in the West, to "re-enforce Canby
by all means. We have felt great anxiety about him."ll Halleck-immediately suggested sending 4,000 to 5,000 men and
raising Canby to the rank of Brigadier-GeneraJ.12 He added,
"I know General Canby well. He is one of the best officers
in the service."13 Washington was at last becoming aware
of the conflict in New Mexico.
While Canby was pleading for additional troops, the
Confederates were having their troubles. Although Union
military leaders complained of the disloyalty and apathy of
the natives, the Texans were equally dismayed. Not only
were their stores in short supply, but they began to realize
that their ruthless policy of confiscation had left them
" ... in the midst of a population of 80,000 souls possessing
7. O. R., I, 9 :651. Connelly to Seward, March 23, 1862.
8. Noel, op. cit., p. 62.
9. L. R., Micro. No. 175. Arny to General (1), March 19, 1862.
10. O. R., I, 8 :627. Halleck to StantOn, :r.i;'rch 20, 1862.
11. Ibid., I, 8 :628. Stanton to Halleck, March 20, 1862.
12. Ibid., I, 8 :629. Halleck to Stanton, March 21, 1862.
13. Ibid., I, 8 :633. Halleck to Stanton, March 23, 1862.
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no very friendly spirit toward us. . . ." Internal command
problems were also causing concern.
. . . a spirit of insubordination and prejudice against
General Sibley, which appears· to have been aggravated by
the fact that General Sibley was sick during the battle near
Fort Craig (as he had been for some days previous) and did
not command on the occasion-a prejudice that goes so.far
as to accuse him of a deliberate plan to deliver his command
into the hands of our enemies.l 4

Although Pelham was established as Governor of the
Territory in' Santa Fe, Major Pyron was in command of the
Confederate troops. Sibley had originally sent men to Santa
Fe because Federal reinforcements from Colorado were reported at Fort Union. The capital was held by the South
for about a month, and many friendly to the Confederacy
were released from "durance."15 The prestige to be derived
from the capture of the enemy capital was probably an additional motive for its. seizure.
With Arizona and southern New Mexico under almost
complete control, and the principal towns and the capital
subjugated as well, the Confederate campaign had reached
its apex. The position of the Texans was precarious however.
With ,supplies running low, with the population indifferent
. to their welfare, if not actually hostile, the invaders could
not remain idle. Too, Fort Craig to the south was manned
by a strong force which cut them off from EI Paso, and to the
northeast was the menace of Fort Union.
In answer to the pleas from New Mexico, volunteer
troops were sent to Fort Union by the Governor of Colorado. 16 The journey was made over difficult terrain and in
inclement weather. Such was' the urgency of the call that
over 400 miles were covered in only thirteen days,17 AI14. Ibid., T, 3 :793. Steele to Cooper, March 7, 1862.
15. Ibid., I, 9:509. Sibley Report, May 4, 186.2. F. S. Donnell in' his "When Las
Vegas Was the Capital of New Mexico," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 8 :265,
October, 1933, recalls that the Union government was removed to Las Vegas at this
time for

a short

period.

16. Hayes, op. cit., p. 164. Governor Gilpin organized the troops from among
the citizens of Colorado, and appointed John P. Slough, a lawyer and "War Demo-

crat," as Colonel.
17. Congressional Globe,

rado, May 8, 1862.

37th Congress. 2nd Session. p. 2026. Bennett of Colo-
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though the additional men were welcomed, a controversy
soon arose over command and strategy. Colonel J. P. Slough,
leader of the Coloradoans, finding that Colonel G. R. Paul
" ... had completed the preliminary arrangements ... by
seniority of volunteer commission . . . claimed the command ...."18
Colonel G. R. Paul, irked ·at being placed in a secondary
position, angrily informed Washington of the action taken
by Slough, and asked for the rank of Brigadier-GeneraJ.19
At the same time he complained that Slough plaI).ned to leave
Fort Union and meet Canby en route, although he (Slough)
had been ordered to remain within the fort. Paul crossly
added that "my object in this communication is to throw
the responsibility of any disaster which may occur on the
right shoulders." 20
Canby, a more cautious strategist, attempted to restrain
the daring Slough by reminding him that the entire effort
was intended to defeat " . . . the Confederates in such a
way that an invasion of this Territory will never again be
attempted."21 Canby, however, did decide to leave Fort Craig
for Albuquerque, although he termed the action of Slough
as "premature" and " ... at variance with my instruction
...."22 In rebuttal Slough, either intentionally or unintentionally misinterpreting his orders, declared that " ... the
instructions of Colonel Canby are not only' to protect Fort
Union, but to harass the enemy." 23. So with 1,300 soldiers,
he started toward Apache Canyon where he had heard that
the enemy had 1,000 troops prepared for battle. 24
Although the ensuing encounter was the turning point of
the entire campaign, neither of the commanding generals
participated. Canby was en route from Fort Craig, while
Sibley was engaged in other pursuits. The barber who
shaved Sibley on the critical morning of the 28th of February reported that the Southern leader was twenty miles .
18. O. R., I, 9:534. Slough to Wash. Hq., March 30, 1862.
19. Ibid., I, 9:646. Paul to Wash. Hq., March 11, 1862.
2J1.. lJ>id... J•..9 :652.. paul to Wash. Hq., .March 24._1862.
21. Ibid., I, 9 :649. Canby to Slough, March 18, 1862.
22. Ibid.• I, 9 :658. Canby to Wash. Hq., March 31, 1862.
23. Ibid.• I, 9:654. Slough to Paul, March 22, 1862.
24. Ibid., I, 9 :533. Slough to Canby, March 29, 1862.
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away, and" ... seems to have been supplied (perhaps for
medicinal purposes!) with whiskey."25
The engagement between the contending forces, Slough
leading the Union, and Colonel W. R. Scurry in charge of the
Texans, took place between Las Vegas and Santa Fe. The
actual fighting occurred at La Glorieta, a pass at the southern end of the Sangre de Cristo range of mountains. This
gap is a few miles long with narrow apertures at either end
which widen out to about a fourth of a mile at the center. 26
The western part of the pass is known as Apache Canyon. 27
The .beautiful growth of cottonwoods and pines which covered the mountains at this point gave the area its name,
and later the entire pass was thus designated. 28
On March 26, the opening struggle began when a detachment under Major John M. Chivington entered Apache
Canyon and met the Confederates, under Major Pyron, who
were already established there. Althollgh Chivington
claimed a slight victory, only a few hundred troops were involved. The Texans retreated, but as night was falling, the
Federals returned to Pigeon's ranch instead of pursuing the
foe. 29 Ban~roft deemed this engagement a Union victorY,30
which it was, although a small one.
The twenty-seventh saw no action, but on the twentyeighth, the fighting was renewed. The region in which the
fighting occurred made ordinary tactics difficult, and Slough,
who now assumed command, termed ". ; . the engagement
of the bushwacking kinq.."31 The fighting lasted over five
hours, and the Union leader considered it " . . . defensive
from its begimiing to its end· . . ." as the enemy was met
unexpectedly.32 Colonel Scurry,. however, regarded this as
" . .. . another victory . . . added to the long list of Con25. Hayes, op. cit., p. 169. Noel, op. cit., p. 62, said "The Commanding General
J

of our forces was an old army officer, whose love for liquor exceeded that for home.
country or God."
J. F. Santee, "The Battle of Glorieta Pass," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
January,
27. Ibid.• p.
Whitford. op. cit., P.
O. R., t,
Chivington to Canby, March
Bancroft, op. cit., p.
O. R., I,
Slough to Canby, March
32. Ibid., t,
Slough to Canby, March

26.
6:66,

28.
29.
30.
31.

71.

1931.

9:530.
9:533.
9:535.

23.
695.

26, 1862.
29. 1862.
30, 1862.
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federate triumphs." The Texans claimed that the fleeing
Union forces were followed until exhaustion demanded that
the pursuit be terminated. The Texas leader found time
for recrimination, when he accused the Federals of having
fired upon a chaplain, who was caring for the wounded, and
who had presumed he was immune from attack because of
the white flag which he was carrying. 33
Regardless of the Confederate claims and charges~ a
successful coup by the Federals did much to bring about the
Confederate retreat which followed. Colonel Chivington,
who had been detached early in the morning, circled to the
rear of the Texans, found their supply train, and burned
the same. The Colonel found time to praise Collins, " . . .
in some way connected with Indian affairs in this Territory,
. . ." who acted as guide and interpreter, and who impressed Chivington with his good sense and bravery.34
Apparently Major William H. Lewis of the Union Army
was an important factor in this action, but never received
the proper recognition. The Rio Abajo Weekly Press
claimed that Lewis actually led the attack, and was forced
to spend two hours in persuading Chivington to proceed. 35
Lewis was not promoted for this action although it had
much to do with the. eventual retreat of the Texans from
New Mexico. This led Meline to observe sarcastically that
this "served him right for not being on duty in some comfortable, quiet place."36
Both sides claimed a major success. However, one Confederate soldier grandiloquently described the retreat from
Glorieta as "every man for himself, nothing on the order of
things. The retreat of Napoleon from Moscow would be
about the only parallel in history."37 Another less sanguine
Confederate trooper felt that "if it had not been for those
33. Ibid., I, 9 :541-2. Scurry Report, March 30, 1862.
34. Ibid., I, 9 :539. Chivington Report, March 28, 1862. Collins was Buperintendent
of Indian Affairs. Department of New Mexico.
35. Rio Abajo Weekly PTess, March 8, 1864. Chivington, an ex-Methodist elder,
was later cqnd_emned by a Joint Military Commission .for the Indian _Massacre Bt
Sand Creek, Colorado, in 1864, Santa Fe Gazette, October 7. 1865.
James F. Meline, Two Thousand Miles on HOTseback (New York: The
Catholic Publication Society, 1873), p. 116.
37. Noel, op. cit., p. 60.

36.
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devils from Pike's Peak, this country would have been ours
, . . ."38 This testimony seemed to bear up the contention
of Governor Gilpin of Colorado who insisted that his troops
were the real victors, and started the Texans on the way
out of New Mexico. 39 Governor Connelly, however, complained that a more smashing victory could have been
achieved if a more aggressive pursuit had been carried out. 40
Later critics of the action at Glorieta emphasize the importance of the rear attack on the Confederate supply wag·ons
as the primary cause for the retreat and eventual evacuation of New Mexico. Twitchell believed that the rear attack
made it " ... impossible for the Confederates to continue
their offensive operations," 41 while Coan thought that it
prevented any plan for attacking Fort Union. 42 Bancroft
also felt that the Confederates retreated (even though they
had an apparent victory) because of the operations of the
men under Chivington. 43
As the Texans hastened from the Territory in small
groups,44 there were words of praise for some of the enemy.
Mrs. Canby, the sister of General Sibley, was lauded by one
of the Confederate troops for her aid to the wounded, and
was declared" . . . a sympathiser [sic] with the south, .
. ." The same soldier also called Canby 4imself ". . . one
of the noblest men that ever served in any army." 45 Another
claimed that" . . . Mrs. Camby [Canby] captured more
hearts of Confederate soldiers than the old general ever
captured Confederate bodies." 46 .
The Confederate retreat down .the Rio Grande was not
completed without some minor military action. Canby had
come from Fort Craig (hastened by the action of Slough),
and had met Paul and Slough thirty miles east of Albuquer38. Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History, II, 380-1, note 303.
39. Holliste;, op. cit., Pp. 126-7.
40. O. R .• I. 9 :660. Connelly to Seward, April 6, 1862.
. 41. Twitchell, op. cit., II, 385.
42. Coan, oj,. cit., p. 212.
43. Bancroft. op. cit., PP. 696-7.
44. L. R., Micro No. 171. Collins to Dole, April 26, 1862.
45.

Lansing B. Bloom, editor, "Confederate Reminiscences," NEW MEXlro HIS5
July,
H. C. Wright letter to T. L. Greer, September
p.
46. Ibid., p.
Harvey Halcomb to Greer, August

TORIOAL REVIEW,

7, 1927.

323.

:315-24,

320.

1930;

5, 1927.
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que. 47 . Canby demonstrated against Albuquerque. as he said,
to draw the Confederates away from Santa Fe,48 but the
townspeople suffered more than the Texans, so this maneuver .was halted. 49
Sibley retreated south to Peralta, where the Union troops
followed, and desultory firing by both sides was engaged
in. 50 It was reported that the Texans became incensed at
their leaders, and allegedly threatened to shoot Colonel
Scurry, who had led them at Glorieta. 51 During the night
of April 13, 1862, the Confederates slipped away, and resumed their flight south. The Union troops pursued, 52 but
apparently without much enthusiasm. Colonel Roberts had
desired to attack the Confederate position in the morning,
but Canby had opposed this. He wished to drive them from
the country without more killing on either side. Mills agreed
that" . . . perhaps he was wise" in doing SO.53
Sibley, continuing south, decided to by-pass Fort Craig
and thus avoid any further military action with which it
would be difficult to cope. At the same time a different route
would mystify the enemy.54 The Confederates reached the
river near Fort Thorn (near where Rincon now is) and
from there on suffered many more hardships. Noel, who
traveled the entire distance related that
, . , we walked and staggered along like the reeling, hungry,
thirsty wretches that we were, with no head, nobody to
direct or command, with the bloodthirsty Dog Canyon Apache
Indian following in· our wake and scalping the poor unfortunate boys whose blistered feet and enfeebled frame made
it· impossible .fo~ them to march farther.

En route to San Antonio the Indians who allegedly had been
friendly to Sibley. on his way west were now the reverse.
Kit Carson was supposedly the instigator of their terroristic
acts, which included the filling of the few available wells
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Mills, op. cit., p. 59.
O. R., I, 9 :550. Canby to Wash. Hq., April 11, 1862.
L. R., Micro. No. 171. Santa Fe Gazette, April 26, 1862.
O. R., I, 9 :510. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.
L. R., 'Micro.
171. Santa Fe Gazette, April 26: 1862.
O. R., I, 9 :551. Canby Report, April 23, ·1862.
Mills, op. cit., p. 60.
O. R., I, 9 :511. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.

No.
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with dead sheep.55 In contrast to the account by Noel another Confederate soldier reported only a few deaths on this,
march south and noted that the pursuit was not close. 56
The Texans, although somewhat reduced in number, had
managed to leave the territory. Canby was criticized' for
this. Bancroft mentioned that he was accused of not wishing to kill old associates (Sibley was his brother-in-law),
of jealousy toward the volunteers (he complained continually about them), and even of cowardice.57 Nevertheless,
the enemy had left, and many lives had been spared. The
lack of food and supplies was an important deterrent to a
more aggressive policy. Canby had complained on numerous occasions about the lack of sustenance available to him.
The floods in the southern part of the territory slowed Union
action. 58 Meanwhile, the Colorado troops, who had played
such an important role, left for home because of this same
lack of food. 59
Despite the Coloradoans leaving, the request for additional Federal troops was reduced from five regiments' to
two, as it was not thought possible to' provi'de for more.
Since the threat of another attack was believed unlikely,60
Canby now set about reorganizing his military forces.
Colonel B. S. Roberts was placed in command of theCentral, Northern and Santa Fe Districts, and Colonels Paul
and Chivington were each given columns to direct. 61 Slough
had resigned. 62 The civil government also came to life again.
Governor Connelly returned to Santa Fe and found that no
one had taken his place. The Gazette noted that "the only
memento they [the Texans] had left for our· worthy Chief
Magistrate was some of Sibley's proclamation's [sic] and
empty champagne bottles."63 Connelly did complain, how55. Noel, op. cit.• pp. 63-4.
56. Bloom, op. cit., p. 323; Wright to Greer, September 7, 1927.
57. Bancroft, op. cit., p'. 698.
58. O. R., I, 9:676. Canby to Wash. Hq.,' June 21, 1862.
59. Hollister, op. cit., p'. 126.
60. O. R., I, 9:669-70. Canby to Wash. Hq., June 21, 1862.
61. Ibid., I, 9:66.4. General Order No. 80, April 16, 1862.
62. Santee, op. cit.• p. 75. 'TwitchelI; The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, II, 885, note 309, says that Slough resigned in disgust because he ";as not
allowed to pursue the Confederates.
'
63. L. R., Micro. No.
Santa Fe Gazette, April

171.

26, 1862.
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ever, that the Texans had damaged his home south of Albuquerque (at Peralta) to the extent of thirty thousand dollars- " . . . much of this through a pure vandalistil;
spirit." 64
As the loyal forces in New Mexico were getting their
house in order, General Sibley had a few parting shots ready
for New Mexico. He believed that
. . . except for its political position, the Territory of New
Mexico is not worth a quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest. . . . The indispensible element, food,
cannot be relied on.

He commented further on the difficulties of another attempt,
saying" . . . sir, I cannot speak encouragingly for the future, my troops having manifested a dogged, irreconcilable
detestation of the country and the people."65
Accounts vary on the number of Texans who were able
to return to the south. Mills believed that only 1,500 of the
4,000 ever got back to Texas,66 while Roberts, a subordinate
of Canby, said only 1,200 of the 3,000 returned and that the
rest were facing complete annihilation. 67 A participant related that less than half who left San Antonio ever got
back, " . . . and the larger half of those who did lived a life
of suffering because of their extreme hardships in this campaign."68
The campaign had been a difficult one for both sides.
The Union forces, however, were to receive unexpected aid
in the struggle. As early as July, 1861, troops were raised
in California to protect the Overland Mail Route to the
East,69 but "treason stalked abroad" in the southern part
of the state, and General James H. Carleton (then a Colonel
of the 1st California Volunteer Infantry) was sent in that
direction. 70 The Federal government also had prepared a
o. R., T, 9 :672. Connelly to Seward, May 17, 1862.
Ibid., T, 9 :511-12. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.
66. Mills, op. cit., p. 73.
67. O. R., T, 9 :666. Roberts to Wash. Hq., April 23, 1862.
68. Noel, op. cit., p. 69.
69. Ray Allan -Billington, with the collaboration of J ames Blaine Hedges, Westward Ezpa1t8ion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), pp. 635-6.
70. O. R., T, 9 :594. McNulty Report, October, 1863.
64.

65.
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plan for an army to be raised on the coastY However, when
Captain Hunter of the Confederate Army occupied Tucson
with a few hundred men,72 the Commanding Officer of the
Pacific instructed Carlton to go forward with the object of
retaking". . . all of our forts in Arizona and New Mexico,
driving the rebel forces out of that country or capturing
them .... "73 The California column thus began its arduous
march across the desert with the double purpose of preventing an invasion· of the coast, and at the same time aiding
the Federal Government. The difficulties encountered were
"almost insurmountable." 74
Early in May the California militia began its journey
from Fort Yuma with over 2,000 troops,75 but moved slowly
because of the shortage of water. 76 The first important stop
was Tucson, Arizona, which was occupied on May 20, 1862.
"without firing a shot."77 In the face of superior numbers.
the Confederates, who had boasted that "the entire population" was southern in sentiment,78 retreated from this advanced outpost, while those private citizens who were
sympathetic to the South geparted for Mexico. 79
From Tucson Carleton sent word to.Canby that he was
enroute, but two of the three messengers were killed by
Apaches, and the third was captured by the Confederates..
Expressman John Jones, although captured, was' able to get
his message through. The knowledge that an additional
enemy 'was so near hurried the Confederate preparations
for departure from New Mexico. On July 4, a small advance
force of California troops arrived near Fort Thorn and
occupied it the next day. Confederate unpopularity 'now
began to reach a head, and rumors were heard that the
71. Captain George H. Pettis, "The California Column," Historical Society of'
New Mexico, Publications, No. 11 (Santa Fe, New Mexico: New Mexico Printing:
Company, 1908), p. 5.
72. Bancroft, op. cit., p. 690.
73. O. R.,. I, 4 :91. Wright to Carleton, January 31, 1862.
74. Ibid., I, 9 :595. McNulty Report, October, 1863.
75. Pettis, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
76. Ibid., p. 10.
77. O. R., I, 9 :533. Carleton to Cal. Hq., May 25, 1862.
78. Ibid., I, 9 :707. Hunter to Bayior, April '5, 1862.
79. Ibid.., I, 9 :533. Carleton to Cal. Hq., May 25,18.62.
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native population was beginning to rise on all sides against
the retreating T.exans. 80
Governor Connelly received word that the southern retreat was due to their having
. . . consumed and destroyed everything even to the growing crops. The people here are with their eyes open toward
the North, in the hope of being relieved from the devastations
of these locusts. More than 1,000 men are waiting with
open arms to receive the liberal Government of the North. 81

The Confederate policy of living off the land was turning
the natives from a feeling of indifference to one of' actual
hatred.
Colonel William Steele, who had been left in charge of
Fort Fillmore by the Confederates, retired to Fort Bliss,
July 8, 1862. In enumerating his reasons for leaving, the
Colonel noted that he had only 400 troops to fight 1,500
Californians, besides those marching from Craig. Furthermore, outnumbered and with ammunition running low,
the natives were not willing to accept Confederate paper
money. When the Texans seized supplies, the people became
aroused. 82 In leaving New Mexico Steele informed the
Union leaders that there was ill will between the Americans
and the natives, and that he want.ed the Americans who re- .
mained to be protected against possible reprisals. 83 When
the Californians entered, they took advantage of this dissatisfac,tionand attempted to gain support by assuring the'
natives that ". ... the era of anarchy and misrule . . ."
was at an end. 84
"\, ,
Canby ordered Carleton to remain within the Mesilla
valiey}5 although the latter wished to pursue' the Texans
dc;>wn the Rio Grande as he felt that ". . . it would be a
sad disappointment to those from California if they should
be obliged to retrace their steps without feeling the enemy."
The Californian also suggested that now might be the time
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid;;
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

I, 9 :554. Carleton to Cal. Hq., July 22, 1862.
I, 50 :1140-1 (part 1). Connelly to Canby, June 15, 1862.
1;9 :722. Steele to Cooper, July '12; -1862.I, 9 :687. Steele to C. O. U. S. Forces.
I, 9 :602. General Order No. 15, August 15, 1862.
I, 9 :683. Canby to Carleton, July 9, 1862.
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to send troops into Texas where he 'had heard that the time
was ripe for action. 80 Colonel E. E. Eyre, a subordinate of
Carleton, comphtined that he had wished to proceed to
Franklin (EI Paso), but had been restrained by Chivington
and Howe. 87 However, even though Carleton was not permitted to continue his aggressive policy, the appearance of
additional troops had much to do with the flight of the
Texans. 88
The success of this long journey was equally divided between the men and their commander. The troops were commended for their endurance and Carleton for the care taken
of his charges. McNulty, the medical officer, believed that
"to conduct this expedition successfully required a clear
head, sound judgement, indomitable will, and perseverance.
All these General Carleton possesses in an eminent degree,"89 A less charitable commentator felt that '~the march
was as good a one as could have been made under so inefficient a general." 90 There can be little doubt that the arrival
was advantageous to the Union cause.
The aid which New Mexico and the Federal Government,
had received from both Colorado and California made it
almost impossible for the Confederacy to achieve any lasting success. Texas alone was not able to furnish, or at least
it did not furnish, enough troops or supplies. Confederate
inability to gain much support from the native population
was also a contributing cause to defeat.

IV Military Affairs After the Invasion
After the invasion attempt of the Texans had been repulsed, there were still many probiems facing the military
and civil authorities. Because the war was yet in progress
in the East,' and because the civil' government had been
superseded by the military in the Territory, the army continued to dominate the scene in New Mexico for several
years. However, General Canby was not to be in charge
86. Ioid.• I, 9 :559. Carleton
87. Ibid.• I, 9 :566. Carleton
'88. Santa Fe New Me",ican,
89. O. R .• 1,9 :602. McNulty
90. Mown" op. cit., p. 60.

to Canby, August 2, 1862.
to Cal. Hq., September 20, 1862.
March 5,- 1864.
Report, October, 1863.'
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much longer, and on August 5, 1862, orders relieving him
from duty in New Mexico were issued. 1 He had· waged a
successful campaign. His cautious 'policy had been criticized
by more daring spIrits, but a victory had been won with
small loss. Too,' his problem of defense had been more difficult than that of the Texans who were not responsible for
the civilian population, and who could live from the land if
they were able. Canby protected not only the private citizens,
but was responsible for military supplies and personnel as
well. The Texans were gone, and he could now recommend
disposal of the available soldiery. He suggested that the
New Mexico Volunteers be used in Indian fighting on the
frontier. 2 The Indians had been unrestrained during the
invasion, and the natives were recognized as excellent for
that purpose. .
General James H. Carleton now became the military
representative of the Federal government,3 and was expected to protect the people of the Territory.4 With the Confederate departure, the· most pressing remaining problem
was that of subduing the Indians who had run wild during
the hostilities with Texas. In handling this important matter Carleton was praised for his" ... wisdom, energy, and
indomitable perseverance ..." 5 The General, however, gave
much credit to the citizens of New Mexico in aiding the army
to rid the country of the war-like tribes. 6
Although the policy of dealing firmly with the Indians
and placing them on reservations was not original with General Carleton or even completely successful under his stewardship, a forceful beginning was made. The chance for a
successful execution of policy possibly would have been
greater except that three governmental agencies-the military, the Indian office, and, to a lesser extent, the territorial
1.
2.
3.
4.
pendix,
5.
ton, D.
6.

O. R .• I, 9 :688. S. O. No. 181 War Department, August 5, 1862.
Ibid., 1, 9 :689. Canby to Wash. Hq., August 6, 1862.
Ibid., I, 9 :582. General Orders No. 84, September 18, 1862.
Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, Sec'y. of War Stanton, App. 29. December 2, 1862.
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Yea,r 1866 (WashingC.: Government Printing Office, 1866), p. 134. Graves to Cooley.
O. R., I, 26 :32 (part 1). General Order No.3, February 24, 1864.
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officials--concerned themselves· with the problem. 7 This division of authority created confusion and misunderstanding.
Another deterrent to success was the limitation of money
and supplies. Carleton thus through necessity proceeded
slowly. The Mescalero Apaches in the southeastern part of
the Territory were partially subdued and sent to Fort Sumner. In the spring of 1863· Carleton turned his attention
toward the Navaho in the northwest. 8
The problem of the Navaho was a much more difficult
one. Carleton conceived the plan of placing all Navahos
with the Mescaleros on a great reservation, the Bosque Redondo, at Fort Sumner. 9 Many of the Navahos refused to
leave their ancestral home and eventually Kit Carson, who
was active and effective in the field, invaded their stronghold at Canyon de Chelly in January, 1864. During the next
few years force and diplomacy were indulged in to persuade
a greater number to go to Fort Sumner. 1O However the entire
group was never completely assembled. l l
The reservation policy forwarded at Fort Sumner by
Carleton aroused a controversial storm. Michael Steck, who
succeeded Collins in New Mexico as Indian Superinten:dent,
although not opposed to the reservation idea, spearheaded
the attack on the Bosque Redondo as a home for the
Navaho. 12 Steck and his supporters also complained of the
fOI:ceful tactics used by Carleton, claiming that greater
success could have been achieved with less expense by a
more peaceful policy.13 Steck gained the support of some
citizens of New Mexico because they feared r.enewed Indian
depredations and the loss of grazing lands. They als~ claimed
that an additional barrier to the East was being erected.14
Although some of the charges against the Bosque reservation were not well founded, the reservation itself proved
7. Frank D. Reeve, "The Federal Indian Policy in New Mexico, 1858-1880,"
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 12 :221, July, 1937.
8. Ibid.. 12 :248.
9. Ibid.• 12 :249.
10. Ibid., 12 :253.
11. Ibid., 12 :254.
12. Ibid., 12 :256.
13. Ralph H. Ogle, "Federal Control of the Western Apaches. 1848-1886." NEW
MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW; 14 :355, October, 1939.
. 14. Reeve, op. cit.. 12 :258.
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a failure for a variety of reasons. Carleton and Carson in
concert did well in rounding up the inhabitants. who were
sent to the Bosque, but were not so successful in coping with
less martial endeavors. 15 The Steck-Carleton controversy did
much to bring about the eventual abandonment of the
Bosque Redondo. However, there were other causes as well.
The site lacked an adequate wood supplY,and a series of
crop failures plagued the Indians in their efforts to adjust
to the sedentary life of agriculturists. In addition the funds
available for, maintenance of the reservation were inadequate, and the hostile Comanches were troublesome as well. 16
In evaluating the whole affair Bancroft praised Carleton for
his policy of Indian removal and the vigor with which it was
carried out, although he considered the location poor, and
the reservation a failure as a means of civilizing the Indian.I7 Twitchell, too, thought the Bosque Redondo a great
failtJ.re as a means of civilizing the Indian, but deemed it a
wise policy as a show of Federal power. 18
Although control of the Indian was a matter of great
concern, Carleton had other problems and duties of importance both to New Mexico and to the Federal government. '
The troops under Carleton not only opened new roads in
New Mexico which were vitally needed and repaired others
damaged by flood, but guarded wagon trains against Indian
attacks as they crossed the barren wastes of the Territory.19
Some new forts were constructed during this period and
old ones were repaired.. The improvements made and the
reconstruction work done by Carleton were held by the Santa
Fe Gazette to be. among his greatest achievements. 2o
Although Carleton had internal problems to solve, he
prepared ~or. another invasion by Texans. This attack was
never consummated, but the preparation was made with
good reason. Th,e Union leader found that" ... rumors are
rife, ... that another demonstration is to be made against
15. Charles Amsden, "The Navaho Exile at Bosque Redondo," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 8 :44, January, 1933.
.
16. Reeve, op. cit., 13 :24.
17. Bancroft, "p. cit., p. 73l.
18. Twitchell, op.. cit., II, 433-4.
19. Santa Fe Gazette. March 18, 1865.
20. Ibid., December 24, 1864.
.

NEW .MEXICO DURING THE CIVIL WAR

267

this country by a rebel force. . . ."21 He lamented that with
such a wide area and so many entrances to defend a plan
of action was necessary. The General planned to gather as
much grain as possible, arrest possible enemies, and arouse
the natives to the new danger and. at the same time permit
them to fight as guerrillas. 22 This was in direct contrast
to the method of Canby, who had attempted to use them in
the same manner as trained troops .were used. Carleton, in
warning Kit Carson, emphasized the different t~ctics, which
were more suited to the surroundings, when he wrote:
If a force of rebels come you know how to annoy ithow to stir up their camps and stock by night; how to lay
waste the. prairies by fire; how to make the country very
warm for them and the road a difficult one. Do this, '.' .23

Possibly because Canby had feared an invasion either via
the Canadian River or the Pecos, Carleton also. kept a
mounted company east of the latter. 24 On one occasion a
group of native buffalo hunters was halted by this mounted
gro~p while going down· the Pecos because it was feared
that the 150 cattle which accompanied them might Jall into
the hands of the Texans. 25 A few months earlier some south-.
ern sympathizers were turned back from the Canadian. 26
There was, however, no report of incoming enemy troops,
but Confederates were stationed not far from New Mexico.
Late in 1862 Colonel Baylor was placed in command of
the northern and western Texas frontier,27 although this
was largely done to defend the country against Indian attack.
The Colonel had his own ideas how the Indian problem
should be met. He held that
.. , the general belief among the people is that the extermination of the grown Indians and making slaves of the children is
the only remedy. This system has been practiced in New
Mexico. There is not a family in that country but has Indian
slaves derived from that source. 28
21. O. R., I, 15 :597. Carleton to Wash. Hq., November 16, 1862.
22, Ibid., I, 15 :599-600. Carleton to West, November 18, 1862.
23. Ibid., I, 15 :579. Carleton to Carson; October 12, 1862.
24. L. R., Micro. No. 173. Collins to Dole, November 13, 1862.
25. O. R., I, 15 :153. Captain W. H. Backus Report, Decembe; I, 1862.
26. Ibid., I, 15 :158. Lt. G. L. Shoup to Backus, December I, 1862.
27. Ibid., I, 15 :858. S. O. No. 26,' November 8, 1862..
28. Ibid., I, 15 :917. Baylor to Magruder,December 29, 1862.
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The Confederate Secretary of War, displeased with the attitude of Baylor concerning Indian slavery, charged that he
(Baylor) could not raise troops for his enterprises in his
own Department. 29
Early in 1863 Carleton began to feel easier as he had
heard of no new rumors, and believed that the only
reason for an invasion (possibly sharing the opinion of
Sibley as to the value of New Mexico) lay in " ... the right
of way to the Pacific, to which great importance is said to
be attached by the Southern Confederacy ... ," or the acquisition of Sonora or Chihuahua. 30 Although the Rio Abajo
Weekly Press had heard of an invasion by "Los Tejanos,"
the paper was confident that Carleton would handle the
situation, especially since he knew how the natives could
best fight,3! and further that they would be allowed to do
SO.32 The invasion threat was not an unmixed blessing, as it
had the effect of keeping troops in the southern part of the
Territory, where they were used to good advantage against
the Indians. 33
There was, however, some pressure for an invasion of
Texas from New Mexico. Canby had felt that such a move
was not practicable because of his lack of confidence in
native troops.34 General Halleck, who was not aware of
actual conditions, later wanted such an effort,35 but Carleton
was dubious because of lack of funds, and felt that" " . if I
can block the road from Paso del Norte, it will be as much
as can prudently be done, ..." 36 Although differing in reason
from Canby, Carleton now was no more anxious than the
former for such an effort. Experience in New Mexico had
brought about a change of viewpoint.
Again in 1865 the matter of a Texas invasion arose. An
entry into southern Arizona from Mexico by a group of
29. Ibid., I, 15 :857. G. W. Randolph to Magruder, November 7, 1862.
30. Ibid.• I. 15 :669. Carleton to Wash. Hq., February 1, 1863.
31. Rio Abajo Weekly Press, April 28, 1863.
32. Ibid., May 26, 1863.
- '33-:--Pettis, op. cit., p. 19.
34. O. R., I, 9 :574. Canby to Carleton, August 11, 1862,
35. Ibid., I, 34 :256 (part 2). Halleck to Carleton, February 6, 1864.
36. Ibid., I, 34 :673 (part 2). Carleton to Halleck, March 20, 1864.
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southern sympathizers,37 and a raid into New Mexico itself
by" ... a band of lawless desperadoes ... ," was expected. s8
Nothing resulted from these threats. However, both Governor Luis Terrazas of Chihuahua 39 and Governor Evans of
Colorado had proffered aid previously,40 and possibly could
be relied upon.
Carleton and the army had some difficulties of an internal
nature as well. Southern New Mexico, the seat of earlier
disaffection, continued as a center of irritation. Sylvester
Mowry, the alleged Confederate sympathizer, was declared
an enemy of the Union by a board of officers 41 who probably
acted more harshly because of the heat of recent conflict.
Mowry, who held mining property in southern Arizona, was
stripped of this under the Confiscation Aet,42 and in June,
1862, was placed in prison. 43 He immediately raised a great
O,utcry, and accused the General of profiting financially in
the matter. 44 The New Mexican recalled that United States
Marshal Cutler was later able to buy this property for
$4,000. 45 The matter was not of tremendous importance,
except to Mowry, but it was a step toward weakening the
position of Carleton, and indirectly placed the military· in
an unfavorable light.
In addition to the Mowry incident, the people in southern
New Mexico were a source of annoyance and concern to
Carleton. The General had retained the system of martial
law which Canby had begun, and the citizens through their
Grand Jury complained bitterly.46 Carleton was not entirely
pleased with the arrangement, as he felt that military officers were carrying a burden which belonged to civil authority,47 When General Halleck received information of military
interference in strictly civil affairs, he ordered that it be
37. Santa Fe Gazette. April 8. 1865.
38. Ibid., May 13, 1865.
39. O. R .• Y, 15 :701. Terrazas to Carleton. April 11. 1863.
40. Ibid., Y. 15 :666. Carleton to Evans, January 28, 1863.
41. Ibid., Y. 9 :693. S. O. No. 17, June 16, 1862.
42. Mowry. op. cit., p. 237.
43. Ibid., p. 62.
44. Ibid.• p. 208.
45. Santa Fe New Me",iean, July 29, 1864.
46. Ibid., July 1.. 1864.
47. O. R., r, 15 :665. Carleton to Arny, January 27, 1863.
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discontinued, if true. 48 The Gazette, however, loyal to Carleton, 'denied that. any military interference with civil authority had ever existed. 49 The southern part of the Territory was doubtless sensitive about past events and resented
close surveillance by the military, although the general populace must have appreciated protection from the marauding
Indians.
The military department was faced also with another
matter, that of peonage and Indian slavery. The distinction
between peonage and slavery was not easily determined, although the condition of peonage was brought about through
debt, while slavery resulted from the capture of Indians who
were forced to labor involuntarily.
The practice of peonage was recognized by law in New
Mexico,50 and there were actual Indian slaves in the
Territory.51 Except for an :occasional servant of an army
officer, negro slavery was never a problem. Carson, who was
familiar with Indian slavery, suggested that it be continued
as a means of taking care of the people, and also of breaking
up the tribes. 52 Carleton strongly rejected the idea. 53
Eventually President Johnson learned of the practice and
recommended its suppression. 54 Peonage was a more complicated matter, and had been accepted in New Mexico,55
but was abolished by law in 1867.56 The actual cessation was
not such an easy matter, and there were slaves for many
years after.
The relative merit and aid given by the troops who came
from outside the Territory caused a minor tempest at the
time ~hich was touched off by a Joint Resolution p'assed
by the New Mexico Legislature, shortly after the Texans
48.
49.
50.
Arny to
51.

Ibid., I, 84:245 (part 2). Halleck to Carleton, February 4. 1864.
Santa Fe Gazette. May 27. 1865.
L. R., Micro No. 182. Executive Message of Acting Governor William F. M.
the Legislative Assembly of the Territory, December 2, 1862.
Ibid., Micro. No. 155. Arny to Dole, January 6. 1862..
52. O. R., I. 26 :284 (part 1). Carson to Carleton, July 24. 1868.
53. Ibid., I, 26 :285 (part 1). Carleton to Carson. August 18, 1863.
54. James D. Richardson, editor. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of
---the-PreBidcnt.,--1789-1897· (Washington, D...C.: ·Bureau-of . National-Literature .and
Arts, 1908). 6:842.
55. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866. p. 187.
56. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, II, 325.
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were driven from the area. Both California a'nd Colorado
were tendered thanks " .' .. for their timely aid and assistance in driving the traitors and rebels from our soil." In
addition, the Californians were praised for their march,
and" ... the utmost confidence ..." was expressed in Carle"ton himself.5 7 Carle.ton, too, issued an order at the time
. praising the troops who participated in the crossing.58 The
New Mexico legislators doubtless were attempting to ingra. tiate themselves into the good graces of Carleton without intending to belittle' the role of the Pike's Peakers. One paper
stated that Governor John Evans of Colorado was the only
complainant regarding the Resolution, and that he was
difficult to please anyway.59 In answer to the complaint the
Legislature attempted to atone handsomely with another
Resolution, which fell short of the mark, when it stated
.
That it was not, nor has it been the intention of the .
Territory of New Mexico, to do the least injustice to the
bravery and sacrifice of our neighbor Territory of Colorado,
nor to place their brave and patriotic soldiers second to none
in the defense of this Territory.60

The troops at the disposal of Carleton were never large
in number, considering the area to be protected. After the
Texans had dispersed, there were 4,680 men available. 61
During the year 1863 the number was decreased by approximately 1,000 ;62 by 1864, it had leveled off at 3,454,63 and was
slightly less the next year. 64 There was a further temporary
reduction at the end of the war due to the mustering out of
the California troops and the discontinuapce of new enlistments. 65 As the discharge of the Californians took place, the
57. Laws of the Territory of New Mexico. Passed by the Legislative Assembly,
Session of 18611-1869. (S~nta Fe, New Mexico: Charles Leib, Publisher of The New
Mexican, 'Public Printer, 1863), p. 106;"
.
58. O. R., I, 15 :575. General Order No. 85, September 21, 1862.
59. Rio Abajo Weekly Press, April 12, 1864.
. 60. Laws of the Territory of New Mexico. Passed by the Legislative Assembly,
Session of 1869-1864. (Albuquerque, New Mexico: Hezekiah S. Johnson, Printer "Rio
Abaio Press," 1864), pp. 128-30. Joint Resolution, February 8, 1864.
61. O. R., I, 9 :696. Carleton Report, September 20, 1862.
62. Ibid.,. III, 8 :1198. Abstract, December 81, 1868. "
68•. Congressi';"'al Gk,be, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix p. 7. Sec'y of War
Stanton, November 22, 1865.
64. O. R., I, 48 :708 (part 1). Abstract, January, 1865.
65. Ogle, op. cit., 15 :12. January, 1940.
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men who had served Carleton so well raised an outcry which
was heard in Washington.' Even the Governor of California
supported them. 66 .
,,-,.
This troop protest reached its climax when the Secret;:try
of War was asked to explain the matter to the House of
Representatives: 67 Some of the Californians were chagrined
over the amounts of travel pay received and over their discharge in New Mexico rather than in California. Carleton
in rebuttal believed that many wished to remain in New
Mexico (as they actually did) and also that the Territory
could use such capable citizens. He advised Washington that
-Political reasons connected with the' filling up of the rich.
mineral lands by a hardy population of experienced miners,
and by trained soldiers, who at· any. time can be called upon
to defend .the country,whether against savages within or
rebels without its borders, should and doubtless will, have
great weight with the government. Such timely forecast will
give an impetus to Arizona a,nd New Mexico which will he felt
not only by these Territories hut by the United States at
large. For it is to such men the country must look for the
speedy development of the precious metals, now so greatly
needed. 68

Editorial opinion in New Mexico was divided over the affair.
Th~ Gazette dismissed the. matter as the disappointment
caused by inaction. It staled that Carleton had treated the
volunteers better than would have been the case if another
officer had been in charge. 69 The New Mexican, which was
opposed to Carleton, reported that the troops were dis~
pleased with guarding peaceful citizens instead of fighting
Indians. 70
•
Conceding that· there was some dissatisfaction, Carleton
had acted in a manner which reflected great concern for
both the national and territorial welfare in attempting to
fill a potentially valuable area with the proper type of
citizenry.
66. House Executive Document, No. 138. 39th Congress, 1st Session (Washing.
ton, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1866). p. 2. Low to Carleton, May 22, 1865.
. -67;--Ibid~1J-=-1~J1ilY-26;-1866.
68. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
69. Santa Fe Gazette. April 15, 1865.
70. Santa Fe New Mexican, January 6, 1865.
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Along with the settlement of individual troop problems,
the matter of peace time military reorganIzation presented
itself. New Mexico was dependent upon expenditures of the
military establishment to a great extent, and naturally was
interested in any alteration of the Military District of New
Mexico. At the beginning of the conflict, New Mexico had
been attached to the Missouri Department; later it was
transferred to California and then returned to Missouri
at the termination of the warY There was some agitation
to make New Mexico a separate department, but that was
unsuccessful. 72 If New Mexico could have achieved this
status'the population would have benefited financially as
more funds would have been spent locally, and the military
would have received equipment and .supplies more expeditiously.
With the end of the war, the critics of Carleton became
more vocal. Much of the criticism stemmed from the policy
of Carleton in establishing the Bosque Redondo as a reservation for the Navaho. The climax was reached when the
Territorial Legislature went so far as to present a memorial
to the Secretary of War, which condemned Carleton and
demanded a Court of Inquiry as to his stewardship.73 Finally,
on September 19, 1866, the General was removed. A short
time previously the Santa Fe New Mexican had complained
tha:t although Carleton had had more troops than at any
previous time, he had done nothing but reward favorites. 74
Carleton had performed good service for the United
States Government and for the Territory of New Mexico;
His attempt to solve the Indian problem and especially his
establishment of Bosque Redondo did not meet with universal approval, but it was at least an honest, forceful attempt. His defensive plans for the Territory were carefully
made and well thought out, even though no further invasions
were attempted by the Texans. While it is difficult to compare Canby and Carleton as each had a different problem,
Carleton seemed to get greater cooperation from the natives
71.
72.
73.
74.

San.ta Fe New Mexican, November 4, 1865.
Ibid.. December 9, 1865.
Ibid., December 30, 1865.
L. R., Micro. No. 198. Santa Fe New Me",ican,. October 27. 1866.
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than did Canby. The willingness of Carleton to utilize' the
New Mexicans in a military way in which they were accustomed made for, better understanding between the
groups. Carleton was the more aggressive military commander. The Gazette, although an admitted partisan,
deemed Carleton" ... a gentleman officer who is more highly
esteemed and appreciated for his genuine worth than any
commanding officer we have ever had, ..." 75

V Politics and Loyalty to the Union
At the outbreak of the war, the Territory was placed in a
difficult position because of the questioned loyalty of part
of its military and civil leadership. Although Twitchell
found that the principal army officers were not loyal to the
Union,1 the situation' was '~larified when actual conflict began. Those favoring the Southern cause resigned their commissioI:\s and joined the Confederacy. It was more difficult,
however, to determine loyalties among those who held civilian positions. Ganaway has found in his study of New
Mexico politics prior to the War, that. the loyalty of some
was questionable, largely because many Southerners had received appointments to public office in the Territory.2
When hostilities began, Abraham Rencher, a former
Congressman from North Carolina, was Territorial Governor. S Samuel Ellison, a close associate, considered .Rencher
" . . . conservative, honest, and intellectual. Was high)y
esteemed by the people of the territory."4 The Governor,
deemed himself a loyal Democrat; who would put his duty
to his country above that to his party,5 while the Gazette
felt that "he has our interest as much at heart as if he had
been chosen by the free suffrages of the people."6 The Terri75. Santa Fe Gazette, April 8, 1865.
1. Ralph E. Twitehel1, "The Palace of the Governors," Historical Society of' New
Mexico, Publicatiornl, No. 29 (N. P., 1924), p. 27.
2. Ganaway, op. cit., p. 91.,
3. W. G. Ritch, 'compiler, The Legislative Blue-Book of the Territory of New
Mexico with the Rules of Order, Fundamental Law, Official Register and ReCOrd,
Historical Data. ClYfnpendium of Facts. etc. (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Charles W.

Greene, Public Printer, 1882). p. 118.

_ _ A.__ .T._Manuel-Espinosn,-','Memoir-of-a--Kentuckian-iTlNevi

'Mexico,~,-1848-I88("

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 13 :9, January, 1937.
5. L. R., Micro. No. 133. Rencher to Co11ins, April.23. 1859. , ..
6. Ibid., ·Micro. No. 144. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, May 22, 1860.
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torial Secretary at the same time was the Irish-born A. M.
Jackson, whose boyhood was spent in Mississippi.:T
When President Lincoln assumed office in 1861, changes
were made in high civil offices in the Territory. Henry Connelly was placed in the gubernatorial chair for the duration. s
The new Governor, although born in Virginia, had lived in
New Mexico since 1828. 9 He had married into a prominent
native family-the daughter of Don Pedro Perea of Bernalilloand the widow of Don Mariano Chaves. lO The appointment by the President was a happy one according to
Twitchell who considered Connelly to be " ... an intensely'
loyal mario . . ." 11 Bancroft, however, said that Connelly
" . . . was a weak man, of good intentions, who, notwithstanding his loyal sentiments, made no. very brilliant record
as a 'war' governor."12 Ellison also was somewhat critical,
terming him as "
of a visionary, romantic, poetic turn,
. . . [although]
tolerated because he was appointed
from the territory. Still he was a good man." 13
At the same time that Connelly was appointed, Miguel
A. Otero was given the post of Secretary. He replaced J ackson, who had gone over to the Confederates, but served only
a few months because the Senate refused confirmation. 14
Otero had been a strong advocate of the slavery code in New
Mexico, and was called "disloyal to. the core" by Twitchell,15
His son, Miguel A., Jr., governor of New Mexico from 1897
to 1906, has softened the charge, declaring that the sympathies of his father were with the South, although he never
favored secession. 16 Mrs. Otero, who had a strong influence
7.
B:

9.

86.

Ganaway, op. cit., p.
Ritch, op. cit., p. 118.
Ganaway, op. cit., p. 95.

Banta. Fe New Me",ican, November 21, 1863.
Twitchell, Old Santa Fe. p. 368.
12. Bancroft, op. cit., P. 706.
13. Espinosa, op. cit., 13 :9. January, 1937.
14. Miguel Antonio Otero, My Life on the Frontier, 1864-1881! (New Y01'k: The
Press of the Pioneers, Inc., 1935), p. 283. According to Twitchell, The Leading Facts
of New Me",ican History, II,' 391-2, the appointments of both' Connelly and Otero
10.

11.

were made entirelY.on the recommendation of John S. Watts, a 8ative of Indiana,
and the Territorial Delegate from New Mexico, . . . . . in whose integrity and loyalty
President Lincoln had great confidence."
.
Twitchell, Old Santa Fe, p.
Otero, op. cit., p.

15.
16.

283.

368.
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upon her,husband, " ... came fro~ one of the most prominent Southern families, and had grown to womanhood in
Charleston, S. C."17 To replace Otero, James H. Holmes of
Vermont received the position, but the next year W. F. M.
Arny succeeded to the post and retained it. until hostilities
ended,18
While the Texans were within the Territory, the civil
government did not function successfully. As long as the
invaders occupied Santa Fe, Connelly remained in Las
Vegas. When the Confederates "had been whipped out" Connelly again took charge of his office. 19 However, during. the
war the civil officers cooperated with the Commanding General in every way.20
As the conflict was about to get under way, Baylor believed that "all" of the prominent Americans with the exception of Connelly were for the South. 21 With many of the
higher army officers and most of the government officials
going over to the Confederate side, what was the position of
the rank and file of the citizenry? One citizen, who had investigated the southern part of the Territory, believed that
the only disaffection existed among the "Americans," who
were mostly Texans. 22 Canby judged the natives to be loyal,
but deplored their apathy.23 An editorial in the Santa Fe
Gazette stated emphatically at the outset that New Mexico
... desires to be let alone. No interference from one side or
the other of the sections that are now waging war. She neither
wants abolitionists or secessionists from abroad to mix in her
affairs at present; nor will she tolerate either. In her own
good time she will say her say, and choose for herself the
position she wishes to occupy. . . .24

Baylor, who had sent such a glowing report of "American" sympathy, soon learned that the natives were" ... de. cidedly Northern in sentiment, ... "25 A Union investigator
17.

Ibid., p. 2.

18, Ritch, op. cit., p. 118.
19. Espinosa, op. cit., p. 9.
20. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Me",icc£D History, n, 392.
21. O. R., 1,04 :109. Baylor to Texas Hq., September 24, 1861.
~. ._L•. K. Micro.. No._160..Collins-to-Dole,-June-22,186L
23. O. R .• 1, 4:65. Canby to Missouri Hq., August 16, 1861.
24. Ganaway, op. cit., p. 91, quoting the 8c£ntc£ Fe Gc£zette, July 13, 1861.
25. O. R., 1. 4:133. Baylor to Sibley, October 25, 1861.
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confirmed the opinion of Sibley when he wrote that "the
Mexican population is with the Government,". although he
a.dmitted that the natives required "encouragement" to be
effective. 26 Very many, however, waited until the Texans
were on the run before showing any great sentiment either
way. It was not until the Confederates were at last repulsed
that the Santa Fe New Mexican trumpeted that
New Mexico is under loyal control. ... The people with
some few exceptions, are loyal in their feelings and wishes.
New Mexico has no other destiny, aside from the north.~7

Aside from the expediency of backing the winning side,
there were several factors in this apparently gradual· shift
from indifference to espousal of the Northern cause. The
expulsion of the Texans had its effect, but there were deeper
roots. Governor Connelly helped by canvassing northern
New Mexico with speech and letter. He reminded the natives
of the past claims of Texas, and ot' her ruthlessness. He attempted to stir up hatred for Texas, rather than emphasizing loyalty to the Union. He also recalled to memory that
the Texans had been defeated in the past.28 Fear of Indian
depredation aided the Union,29 especially as the war gave
the redfolk greater opportunity to create havoc. The economic' motive was possibly the greatest of all. Union currency, which had been spent in the past and also during the
conflict, filtered into many pockets. On the other hand, the
Texans, either because they were unable, or because they
refused, did not pay as readily as the Union did. 'rhe natives
were suspicious of the Confederate paper. Brevoort, who
called the war "a great blessing to the natives," opined that
Naturally the people were inclined to favor the party that
treated them fairly and seemed willing to protect them. That
was the secret of their devotion to the northern side. 30
26. L. R., Micro. No. 161. Steck to Collins, July 15, 1861.
27. Santa Fe New Mexican, November 21, 1863.
28. Gan';way, op. cit., p. 96. Citing Watts to Lincoln, (N. D.: Washington,
.. N .. A.) Justice Dept. Records, Atty. Gen. Mss.
.
29. Ibid., p. 125.
30. Maurice G. Fulton and Paul Horgan, editors, New Mexico's Own Chronicle
(Dallas, Texas: Banks Upshaw and Company, 1937), pp. 201-2.' Extract from
Elias Brevoort, 'fA Common Soldierts Impressions."
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This matter of fair financial dealing and kind treatment
rewarded the Union with tangible fruits. Although Canby
complained of slow volunteer enlistments,31 Connelly was
" ... proud to say that my loyal and patriotic fellow-citizens
of New Mexico have manfully responded to their country's
call; . . ."32 He placed the number in the field at 3,500,33
although Twitchell said that Connelly and Canby between
them achieved the seemingly impossible and signed up between 5,000 and 6,000. 34
The greatest sympathy that existed for the Confederacy
was confined pretty largely to the south of the J ornada del
Muerto. This region felt neglected by the government in
Santa Fe,35 and there was some sentiment for separation.
As early as 1854, a representative from Dona Ana County
had unsuccessfully requested division to the New Mexico
legislature. 36 Sylvester Mowry, who later was to corne in
conflict with Carleton, was one of the leaders in this move.
His mining interests in Arizona, which were not fully protected by the government, no doubt prompted this action,
although he was lauded as a lover of that region. 37 Mowry
wished to include within his proposed territory the settlements along the Rio Grande which lay south of the Jornada.
as this area contained two;..thirds of the population of Arizona, which he placed at 10,000. He believed that
The only effect of the present cqnnection of Arizona With New
Mexico is to crush out the voice and sentiment of the American people in the Territory; and years of emigra~ion under
present auspices would not serve to counterbalance or equal
the influence of the 60,000 M~xican residents of New Mexico.
31. O. R., I, 4:61.' Canby to Wash. Hq., July 29, 1861.
32. Journal or the Council oj the Legi8lative A88embly of New Me",ico, of a
S688ion Begun and Held in the City of Santa Fe. Territory of New Meo;i~o, 'on
Monday, the Second Day of December; A. D .• 1881. It Being the Eleventh Legi8lative
A88embly for Said Territory (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Putnam O'Brien, Printer,
1862), P. 20.
33. Ibid., p. 22.
34. Twitchell, The Leading Fact8 of New Me",ican Hi8tory, II, 374.
36. F. S. Donnell, "The Confederate Territory of Arizona, As Compiled from
Official Sources," NElW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 17:148, April, 1942.
·Patrick Hamilton, compiler, .T.lte Re8ource8 oj Arizona, (San Francisco:
A. L. Bancroft & Co., Printers, 1883), p. 13~ . . . . . 37. Browne, 01'. eit., 30 :282. February, 1865.

36.
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New Mexico has never encouraged American population. She
is thoroughly Mexican in sentiment, and desires to remain
so.38

The feeling in southern New Mexico reached a head in
March, 1861, when a convention held at Mesilla resolved
" . ~. ~ not to recognize the present Black Republican Administration...."39 This was strong talk, and was backed up by
threats to tar and feather a representative of the Indian
Service. Labadi, the agent thus threatened, was permitted to
leave unharmed because he was "a Mexican." 40
This Confederate sentiment was not entirely unaJ?imous
however. There were requests to the governor from Mesilla
for troops,41 and a Federal agent believed that
There is ... a latent Union sentiment here, especially among
the Mexicans, but they are effectually overawed. Give them
something to rally to, and let them know that they have a
Government worthy of their support, and they will teach
their would-be masters a lesson. 42

In the northern part of the Territory, where seventy
per cent of the population and re$ources were located,43
Confederate sentiment was the exception rather than the
rule. There were some efforts to escape service in the
militia,44 but the people in most instances cooperated with
the military authorities. 45 The Armijo brothers of Albuquerque were important Confederate· sympathizers. Sibley
was so grateful for their support, both moral and financial,
that he recommended that they not be forgotten in the final
reckoning. 46
When the Texans were finally expelled from the Territory, resumption of the elective processes was' in order.
88.
89.

1861.
40.
4i.

Mowry, op. cit., pp. 83-35.
L. R .• Micro. No. 160. Resolution of Convention Held at Mesilla, March

Ibid., Micro. No. 160. Labadi to Collins, June 16, 1861.
O. R., I, 1:605. N. M. Hq. to Paul, May 19, 1861.
42. Ibid., I, 4:56. Mills to Watts, June 23, 1861.
43.. Ibid.• I, 4:46. N. M. Hq. to Lynde,' June 23, 1861.
44. Ibid., I, 4:71. Chapin to Russell, September 27, 1861.
45. Santa Fe New Mexican, May 7, 1864.
46. O. Ii., I, 9 :511. Sibley Report, May 4, 1862.
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During the time of tri~ll, politics were kept quiet, but in
1863 it was possible to hold the election for the important
post of territoriaJ delegate to the United States House of
Representatives. J oab Houghton, ". . . a gentleman in
every sense of the word . . . ," was suggested as a likely
candidate,47 but he later withdrew to aid in the defeat of
Jose Gallegos, " . . . the disgraced priest . . . ,"48 who had
entered the lists. In opposition to Gallegos; who had a stron'g
native following, Colonel Francisco Perea was entered by
his friends. 49
The question of the fitness of Gallegos for the post was
an important factor in the campaign which ensued, although
the question of statehood was an issue too. The politicians
opposed to statehood were accused of resisting the idea because of the possibility of losing their government posts.
Attempts were also made to raise the bogey of increased
taxation, and Federal troop withdrawals, if statehood were
achieved. 50
. In the meantime Arizona was detached from New Mexico
by Act of Congress, and made into a separate territory.51
There was also some sentiment in Dona Ana County for
separation from New Mexico. According to Arny there was
a plan afoot to merge Franklin County, Texas, and Dona
Ana County into a new territory to be called Montezuma,52
but this proposition was never consumated.
The Gallegos-Perea contest terminated in the quiet and
comparatively honest election of September 7, 1863.53 The
two-to-one victory of Perea was determined by heavy. majorities in Bernalillo, Valencia, and Socorro Counties, and
47. Rio Abajo Weekly Press, March 17, 1863.
48. Ibid., June 30, 1863,' The issue of June 16, 1863, relates that Father GaIlegos
came in conflict with Bishop Lamy, and was forced to leave the church in 18?2.
Twitchell in his Leading Facts of New Mexican' History, II, p. 334, mentions that
GaIlegos then turned to politics, and was elected delegate from, the territory in 1853.
49. W. H. H. AIIison, "Colonel Francisco Per~a:" Old. Santa Fe: A Mag<izine
of History, A;chaeologll, Genealogy, and Biography (l :210-23: October, 1913), p. 219.
50. Rio Abajo Weekly Press, March 10, 1863.
"
'
,61. Twitcb.eIl, The Leading Facts of New Mexican 'History, II, 409. The Act
separating Arizo~';:-.;;,;",- passed Febriiary '24',1863:- TwitcheIl says that N~w Mexico
had favored this since 1858.
62. Rio Abajo Weekly Press, April 21, 1863.,
63. Ibid., September 8, 1863.
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was credited more to anti-Gallegos feeling than to any
other .factor. 54
The election of 1865 between Perea and J. Francisco
Chaves for the position of congressional delegate was,f9r
s~veral reasons, more bitter struggle than that of the previous campaign. The issues were more distinct, and the personal angle was altered. The most controversial issue arose
from the placing of the Navaho at Bosque Redondo. 55 Those
who oPIlOsed the reservation policy favored Chaves,56 and
those who defended the plan of Carleton supported Perea.
Corruption allegedly entered the New Mexico Legislature
for the first time over this matter, :with bribery being used
to support the policy of Carleton in order to make it more
palatable.57
. A less controversial issue was the re-acquisition of Los
Conejos, th.at section of New Mexico which had been granted
by Congress to Colorado in 1861. The cpmplaint wa!'? raised
that the only reason for the change ". . . was to give
eveness (sic) and symmetry to the southern boundary of
Colorado." Further arguments in favor of reversion included the fact that the' people were more closely aligned
racially and linguistically with New Mexico. 58 Perea had
introduced a bill to return the section to New Mexico, but
Colorado refused to give it Up.59 The supporters of Chaves
presumably thought that he would exert greater efforts for
the return of the disp~ted area.
Carletonhirnself was an issue in the race. He was disliked by many in New Mexico,60 and the long occupancy and
control of the territory by the army probably wearied the
citizens as well.
The campaign was a long and bitte,r one. Kirqy Benedict, who had long held public office in New Mexico, was
accused of wishing the position for himself,61 although he
64. Ibid., September 15, 1863.
66. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866, p. 131.
66. Sanfa Fe Gazette, June 10, 1865;'
67. Espinosa, op. cit., 13 :9. January, 1937.
58. Santa Fe Go.zette, February 18, 1865.
59. Santa Fe Go.zette, July 23, 1864.
60. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs f()T the Year 1866, p. 131
61. Santa Fe Go.zette, December 24, 1864.
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supported Chaves for the post. 62 When President Johnson
removed Benedict from office, the Gazette had an opportunity to castigate its opponent (Benedict) when it chided
that
.
He has gone up the spout, and if he is possessed of the
'fine legal attainments, and the thorough knowledge of the
Spanish language and laws,' which he proclaims for himself,
he will soon be in a condition to put them into re-quisition,
as well as his 'extended popularity' with the people. But if his
success as a practitioner should be no more 'ample and brilliant' than has been his official and editorial career it will
not be much to brag on. 63

Benedict continued his leadership of the anti-Carleton party,
however.
Perea, who conducted a gentlemanly campaign, came out
for the reservation policy of Carleton, and at the same time
deplored the injection of the race issue into the election.
He spoke highly of his opponent, as "friend and relative."64
Both parties filled their platforms with platitudes, but
at the same time took a firm stand on the principles upon
which they stood. The Union Convention which had nominated Perea supported the reservation policy, praised Carleton arid promised him support, thanked the troops, recognized the supremacy of the civil government, condemned
the assassination of Lincoln, and denounced the raising of
the race issue. 65 The "adminfstration" party, which had
chosen Chaves, opposed Carleton and his policies, plumped
for internal improvements, and felt that
. . . the native citizens of this territory are entitled to the
same rights, privileges arid liberties as any other citizens
from other parts in the United States who may establish
themselves among us. 66

The day after the election, Chaves was proclaimed the
winner by unofficial totals. 67 A short time later this count
62. Ibid., August 5, 1865.
63. Ibid.. July 1. 1865. The Gazette, November 26. 1864, mentions that Benedict
was editor of its rival, the New Mexican, for almost a year.
64. I/jid:.-Ju!y 8. 1865.65. Ibid., June 21. 1865.
66. Ibid., April 29, 1865.
67.· Santa Fe New· Mexican, September 8, 1865. Twitchell, in his LeMing Facts
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was made official, and Chaves was declared the victor with
a majority of over 2,000 out of a total vote of over 14,000.
Perea had been able to carry only Rio Arriba and Mora
Counties. 68
Thus, with the end of the war, New Mexico returned to
the practice of selecting her delegates to the U. S. Congress.
Carleton and his policies were repudiated, and the native
voters entered polltics to a greater extent than had· been
the case previously. These early territorial elections set the
pattern for later heated contests which were to become
common.

VI Economic Conditions
Economically the Territory of New Mexico was not
prosperous, but efforts were being made by her leaders to
improve the situation. The strongest factor in economic
retardation 'was the presence of the warlike Indian, but
there were others as well. Lack of adequate communication
with, and transportation to, the East kept the Territory in
financial bondage. A short water supply and a sparse population were other important factors. The leaders of the area
were aware of these difficulties, and were trying to alter or
alleviate them, which boded well for the future.
To the above conditions, the war added another problem. The citizens of New Mexico had been hard hit finlmcially. It was claimed that the war had caused an estimated
loss of at least two or three million dollars. 1 To aid in making up this loss, various suggestions were presented. While
the war was in progress, John S. Watts, the Territorial
Delegate, proposed to Congress that large amounts of unsold Texas land should be confiscated and turned over to
New Mexico, He pointed out that this' would be just, as
Texas had invaded New Mexico. 2 Another idea presented to
Congress favored the confiscation of the property belonging
to disloyal citizens. This confiscated property then might
of New Mexican History. II, 400, recalls that Colonel Chaves fought at Valverde and
in ~umerous Indian campaigns. In the election of 1867 Chaves was seated after a
contested election. He was re-elected in 1869, but defeated by J. M. Gallegos in 1871.
68. Santa Fe Gazette. September 30, 1865.
.
1. Congressio'llal Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4307. J. F. Chaves.
2. Ibid., 37th Congress, 2nd Session, July 9, 1862, P. 3154.
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qe turned over to those who had remained loyal,3 Later,
another plan was' formulated. This called for Congress to
make direct appropriations, and thus pay for the damage
and loss due to "the T~xas invasion."4 According to Bancroft, the claims of New Mexico citizens were never paid. 5
Twitchell felt that the territorial delegates from New Mexico did not accomplish much for their constituents in this or
other matters during this period. 6
Although the Indians were a source of danger and loss,
(Carson allegedly said that New Mexico would be impoverished as long as the Indian remained) 7 their presence was
of some assistance to the territory. Twitchell opined that
much of the prosperity of Santa Fe depended on army spending,8 while Marcy held that not many would stay were it not
for the army and the Indian contracts. 9 J. K. Graves, special
Indian Agent for New Mexico, said, "Let the government
withhold the purchase of military supplies, . . . and New
Mexico would instantly assume an attitude of mourning
and sorrow, . . . "10
But there was a bright side to the financial picture. If
the citizenry had suffered a severe loss, and the Territory
was not rich, its delegate could boast that the Territory did
not owe a dollar anywhere,u This condition continued, and
almost two years later her government still spoke of the
" . . . truly prosperous conditions of its [New Mexico's]
Finances."12 Bancroft states that the Territory was never
in difficult financial straits. I3
Territorial leaders recognized that access to the outer
world was a crying need. It was necessary to use troops to
Ibid., 38th Congress, 1st Session, June 11, 1864, P. 149. Perea.
Ibid., 39th Co'ngress, 2nd Session, February 7, 1867, p. 1073.
6. Bancroft, op. cit., p. 719.
6. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican Hist01'1/, II, 399;
7. Meline, op. cit., P. 249.
8. Twitchell, Old Santa Fe: p. 324.
9. Randolph B. Marcy, Border Reminiscences (New York: Harper and Brothers, '
Publishers, 1872), p. 378.
10. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866, p. 134.
11. CongreBsional Globe, 37th Congress, 3rd Session, February 27, 1863,p. 1849.
Watts.
_
12. Santa Fe Gazette, December 10, 1864.
13. Bancroft, op.cit., p. 717.
8.
4.
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guar.d and open new wagon roads. 14 While the' lack of roads
r~tarded progress, the need for telegraph and railroad
service to the East was of greater moment. Possibly despairing of government aid, an effort had been made before
the war to finance a telegraph line from Denver to Santa
Fe with private capital. An attempt was made to revive
the idea. 15 In 1862 Congress passed a bill to establish railroad and telegraph facilities between the Mississippi and
the Pacific. New Mexico was hopeful that the route would
pass t:r.rough her lands. Perea introduced a bill in Congress
to achieve this goal, but it failed to pass. 16
Even though efforts along this line were unsuccessful,
the agitation was continued. Some encouragement was' received from Major General Dodge of the Missouri Department, who favored the building of the telegraph through the
Territory, although he doubted very much whether the War
Department would approve itP In advancing the idea of a
railroad through New Mexico, the Gazette cited the advantages which would accrue to the nation, if such a step were
followed. The lower aititude, the many passes, and the supplies of coal and water were all stressed,18 but to no avail,
even though the need for a railroad was great. 19
. Trade with the East continued to grow, although more
modern communication was denied the Territory. From a
scant 20.0 wagons per year which had entered New Mexico
in 1843, the number had grown to over 3,600 by the end of
the war. Unfortunately, many of these were forced to return to the East empty.20 During the war years almost all
commerce was halted because of the Indians. 21 By 1863
Carleton was able to notice'the increased' trade, some of
which was occasioned by the establishment of the Bosque,
1"4. House Executive Document, No. 70, 38th Congress, 1st Session. (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), XVI :30. Halleck to Stanton, No--:e;"ber 15,
1863.
15. SantIL Fe GILzette, Nove":'ber 5, 1864.
16. Ibid., November· 5, 1864.
17. Ibid., 'April 15, 1865.
18. Ibid., October 28, 1865.
19. Ibid., October 21, 1865.
20. Meline, op. cit., p. 254.
21. Bancroft, op. cit., P. 644.
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but thought that New Mexico would never be prosperous
until the Indians had been forced out of the way.22
By 1865 the price of goods in New Mexico had risen;
even though they had fallen in the East. 23 Part of the responsibility for this was placed on the shoulders of the speculators,24 but the rise of wages and of prices of local products
due to the war was a contributing factor. 25
Although there was little tangible evidence that the population was increasing by immigration, the Rio Abajo Weekly
Press hopefully expected suchan influx. 26 The census figures, however, did not bear out this wishful thinking. In
1860 New Mexico had a total population of 93,516. Of this
number 82,924 were white, with a free colored population
of only 85. The Indians reputedly numbered 10,452, and
half breeds were listed at 55. 27 Arizona County which was
separated from New Mexico before the next census, was
credited with a total population of only 6,428.28 Acting
Governor Arny believed that of-this total of almost 100,000
over fifty per cent could not read or write. (There was not
a. free school in the Territory, except those conducted by the
Catholic Church.) 29
When the Census was taken a decade later, New Mexico
actua.lly showed a loss in numbers. The figures then read
91,874. The loss of Arizona accounted for much of this decrease, but it was evident that the Territory was not making
much progress towards increasing its population. The
colored population, although negligible in number, had increased over 100 per cent from ~5 to 172.30
New Mexico was able to retain some of the soldiers who
had come with the Californhi Column, but was desirous of
22. o. R., I, 15 :723-4. Carleton to Hq., May 10, 1863.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Santa Fe Gazette, April I, 1865.
Ibid., November 19, 1864.
Ibid., November 12, 1864:
Rio Abajo Weekly Press, January 27, 1863.
Census for 1860 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1864), p.

567.

28. Ibid., p. 567.
29. The Second Annual Message of Acting Governor Arny to the Legislative Assembly oj New Mexico. Delivered" December, 1866 (Santa Fe, New Mexico: Manderfield and Tucker, Public Printer, 1862), p. 5.
30. Census for 1870 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office," 1872),
PP. 8-12.
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encouraging still further soldier immigration. The mining
opportunities were emphasized to this group, as well as the
chance to continue the adventuresome life which had been
followed in the Army. The Gazette offered these" ... high
spirited, well-meaning fellows, but hard to manage, . . ." a
chance to acquire". . . not only wealth, but plenty of bushwhacking for those who have a passion for that sort of
amusement." 31
What resources the T~rritory possessed were bound up
chiefly in mineral and pastoral wealth. 32 The Pinos Altos
region in the southwestern part of the Territory ~as the
scene of a mild boom in 1860 when gold was discovered and
1,500 people were drawn to the area,33 although there had
been reports of earlier gold found there by the Mexicans. 34
During the war, however, mining and farming were practically abandoned within the area when the troops were
withdrawn in the spring of 1861.35 The region prospered
again in the years 1862-1864, when mining operations were
resumed. A new mining rush occurred in 1866.36 In 1863
the first important silver in New, Mexico was found near
Magdalena and Pueblo Springs. 37
To encourage prospecting, or at least to assure more
equitable opportunity in that ,field, the Legislature authorized every discoverer to register, up to the length of 600
feet, any vein found. The entire width of the vein was to
be included as well. 38 A geologist was engaged by Watts to
survey the mineral wealth of the Territory. He reported a
visit to the Santa Rita area, and also to the Organ Mountains to the east of Las Cruces. Copper was the important
ore in the above places. Deposits of kaolin used in the making of procelain were located in New Mexico. This was
prized because known locations in the United States were
31. Santa Fe Gazette, August 12, 1865.
32. Ibid., July 29, 1865.
33. Stuart A. Northrop, Minerals of New 'Mexico (Albuquerque. New Mexico:
The University of New Mexico Press, 1944). p. 23;
34. R. S. Allen,' "Pinos Altos. New Mexico," NFlw MFlXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW,
23 :302. October. 1948.
85. Reeve, op. cit., 18 :284. July, 1938.
36. Allen, op. cit., 23 :305. October, 1948.
37. Northrop, op. cit., p. 24.
'
38. Santa Fe Gazette, April 8, 1865.
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few. A five foot thick coal bed also was reported in the
northern part of the Territory; along with several other
smaller deposits. 39 None of these was a recent discovery,
but promised something for future prosperity. In addition,
gold and anthracite were reported north of Santa Fe, and
copper near the Jemez pueblo. 40
Colonel Perea spoke glowingly of the mineral wealth to
be derived in New Mexico, which he claimed was attracting
attention in the East. He wrote of the
. . . mountains that have towered to the heavens from
primeval time, in the sullen majesty of their hidden wealth,
[and .which] will now unbosom their treasures to the magic
call of civilization, and your neglected country will rise,
from the shades of an unrevealed wilderness, into the light
of a brilliant and commanding development.41 .

Along with the optimistic prediCtions of wealth for New
Mexico, there were definite drawbacks to utilization of the
Territorial minerals. President Lincoln had noted the "great
defiCiency of laborers" not only in New Mexico, but in the
entire West in both mineral and agricultural pursuits. 42
Secretary of Interior J. P. Usher stressed the need for a
railroad into the area,43 and later complained that the mineral wealth was being "indifferently wrought" because of
its inaccessibility.44 A lack of water in certain areas was
an additional drawback,45 while the Indians again were
blamed as a factor in preventing further exploitation of the
metals in the region. 4~
.
Aside' from the minerals, the other principal sources of
New Mexican wealth lay in pastoral and agricultural pur39. Ibid., November 12, 1864.
40. Ibid., November 26, 1864.
41. Ibid., July 28, 1864.
42. Congressional Globe, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, p. 1. Lincoln Address, December 8, 1868.
43. Ibid., p. 26. Usher Report, December 5, 1868.
44. Ibid., 38th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 21. Usher Report, December 5, 1864.
45. Santa Fe Gazette, April 8, 1865.
46. Journal af the Hause af Representatives of the Legislative Assembly af New
Mexico, of .the Session Begun and Held in the City af Santa Fe, Territory of New
Mexico on Monday, the Seventh Day of December, "A. "D. One Thousand Eight Hundred
and Sixty-Three; It Being the Thirteenth Legislative Assembly far said 'Territory
(Sants Fe, New Mexico: Thomas S. Tucker, Public Printer, 1864), p. 21. Message of
Governor Connelly, December 9, 1868.
.
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suits. General Carleton considered the Territory as ". . .
eminently a stock growing country" and thotlght that a
market could be provided at home, if other settlement could
be encouraged. 47 Although the possession of "many fine
grazing lands" was extolled, a warning note was added that
"energy and perseverance" were necessary because "drones
cannot succeed." 48
,
Sheep, along with cattle, were also prominently in the
picture. The same grazing lands were available to them.
Recommendations were made for improving the stock, whiCh
would thus procure a higher price for the wool produced.
New MexiCan wool was bringing only fifteen cents a pound
in the Eastern ,market in comparison with eighty cent wool
from other regions. 49 Shortly after the Texans left, New
Mexico was able to boast of at least a million pounds being
shipped to Kansas City, but even though selling there for
fifteen cents, it brought only four cents to the Territorial
producers. These figures aided in the creation of a demand
for, the establishment of wool processing and manufacturing in the Territory itself. lio During the next year the price
paid in Kansas City per pound had risen to forty cents,
which heartened the producers considerably.li1 Still demands
for local processing were continued. 52
When actual combat on New Mexican soil had terminated, the Territory still faced the problem of supplying
itself with sufficient grain. In 1863 crop failures occurred
in the Rio Abajo,li3 and the next year the eastern frontier
and the area,south of ~he Jornada suffered the same fate. 54
This contributed to the rise of food prices. In 1865 the
region south of Albuquerque suffered, not only from frost
and insects, but from river floods as well. M Although the
wheat "failed entirely," the corn crop unexpectedly yielded
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Sant4 Fe Gazette, January 21, 1865.
Ibid.• November 25, 1865.
Rio Aba;o Weekly Press, April 7, 1863.
Ibid.• February 17. 1863.
Sant4 Fe Gazette, August 20, 1864.
Repori of the CommissiO'n<1T of Indian Affairs for the Year 1866, P. 135.
Santa Fe Gazette, June 21, 1865.
Ibid.• November 5, 1864.
Ibid., June 17, 1865.

290

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

well. Carleton, after having experienced several near
famines, ordered. corn and flour to be brought in, although
this move later proved unnecessary.56
Irrigation, which had been practiced by the Indians for
.centuries, was an important answer to the problem of flood
and famine which plagued New Mexico. It was suggested
that if irrigation were increased, the greater acreage available would encourage further immigration, and that these
new settlers would soon supply the population with the
necessary food. 57 Systematic irrigation was expected to
cover "... with luxuriant vegetation millions of acres~"58
The flood problem was not so easily answered, but Baldwin has blamed the war at least for the floods in the southern
part of the Territory.· In some cases lack of man power
and finances ~aused by the conflict allowed irrigation ditches
to be weakened, and thus fall easy prey to flood waters.
The change of the course of the river which placed Mesilla
on the east bank of the Rio Grande in 1865 was· attributed
to this. 59
The Territory was aware of the need for improvement
of its economic condition, but was not entirely successful
in coping with the situation. The comparatively meager
resources available plus the lack of interest shown by the
East were insurmountable difficulties. The problems of the
1860's are to some extent still present today.

56. Ibid., December 2, 1865.
57. House Miscellaneous Document, No. 70, 38th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. c.: Government Printing Office, 1864), III:1.
58. Senate Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, 1860, 37th .Congress, 2nd
Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1862), p. 90.
59. P. M. Baldwin, "A Short History of the Mesilla Valley," NElW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, 13 :314-24. July 1938, P. 320.
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